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Faculty and Deans

ESSAY
On Revolution and Wetland Regulations
MICHAEL

J.

GERHARDT*
INTRODUCTION

A great divide separates constitutional and environmental law. Most scholars
in each field proceed with minimal reference to the work of their counterparts or
developments in the other field. A useful example of this division is wetlands
regulation. In the study of constitutional law, wetlands regulation is generally
ignored, much less considered to have any relationship to the larger questions
that constitutional scholars debate: the proper role of the judiciary in our
constitutional system of government, 1 how the Constitution should be interpreted,2 and the requisite conditions for revolutionary change in constitutional
law. 3 Yet, wetlands regulation has been the subject of intensive, long-standing
debate in the environmental community over the legitimacy of extensive federal
regulations of commercial activity to protect the quality of the nation's air and
water. 4 That intense debates about revolution occur in each field without any
reference to the other reflects an unfortunate tendency among scholars, if not
lawyers, to fall into a postmodem trap in which they resist recognizing, and
therefore ignore, the possible interconnectedness of legal developments in
different fields. The fields of constitutional and environmental law are not neatly
divided in the world of practice, but they are artificially separated in the
academy, the classroom, and legal scholarship. A significant consequence of
these divisions-and the ensuing insularity of the scholars in the fields of

* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I am grateful to Michael Dorf,
Deborah R. Gerhardt, Alan Meese, and Adrian Vermeule for comments on earlier drafts; and to Paul
Dame, William & Mary Law School Class of 2003, for excellent research assistance.
I. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES
2-5 (2d ed. 2000) (describing the evolution of constitutional theory as an effort to explain the
"countermajoritarian difficulty"-{)r the problem of unprincipled judicial interference with democratic
government (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLlTICS 15-16 (2d ed. 1986))).
2. See generally GERHARDT, supra note I, at 423-59 (providing an overview of interpretation theory
and postmodemism).
3. See generally Symposium, Moments of Change: Transformation in American Constitutionalism,
108 YALE L.J. 1917 (1999) (discussing Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional revolution).
4. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 Mo. L. REv.
1242, 1243 (1995) ("Wetlands regulation may be the most controversial issue in environmental law. It
pits America's most biologically-productive and most rapidly-diminishing ecosystems against rights
of private ownership and property development in more than 10,000 individual permit decisions a
year.... " (citing OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, REGULATORY QUARTERLY REPORT (Fifth Quarter, 1994)).
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constitutional and environmental law-is the failure of many academics to
appreciate the implications of a significant change in one field for the other. 5
To be sure, there have been references to revolution by a few constitutional
and environmental commentators. In especially dramatic fashion, Judge Douglas Ginsburg of the D.C. Circuit gave the prospect of revolution a name in 1995.
In the course of condemning the direction of American constitutional law in
favor of excessive deference to regulatory authorities, he declared:
So for 60 years the nondelegation doctrine has existed only as part of the
Constitution-in-exile, along with the doctrines of enumerated powers, unconstitutional conditions, and substantive due process, and their textual cousins, the
Necessary and Proper, Contracts, Takings, and Commerce Clauses. The
memory of these ancient exiles, banished for standing in opposition to
unlimited government, is kept alive by a few scholars who labor on in the
hope of a restoration, a second coming of the Constitution of liberty--even if
perhaps not in their own lifetimes. 6

This is strong language, seemingly at odds with a judge reputed to be committed to the ideal of judicial restraint. His strong words, coupled with his own
prominent position within the federal judiciary, suggest that he and other

5. In the area of environmental law, the commentary on revolution has focused mostly on the
continued viability of the environmental initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s and the frustrated hopes of
some conservatives for a revolution that would roll back the regime of environmental protections
implemented in accordance with these initiatives. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The
Environmental Challenge to Federalism, 9 SuP. CT. EcoN. REv. 205, 241 (2001) (suggesting that
environmental interests have not yet mounted a serious, revolutionary challenge to the Court's
environmental jurisprudence but that the Court in the long run will have to confront the implications of
its evolving federalism jurisprudence for environmental law because it will not always be able to avoid
conflict by using ambiguity in statutory language or other means); Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 395, 430 (1995) ("If we want to reach the goals set out
when the environmental revolution started, we must modify, in very fundamental ways, the model for
our control mechanism. The next wave of environmental law, to be effective, must be coordinated and
comprehensive, instead of haphazard and piecemeal."); Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America
and the Graying of United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law's First Three
Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 105 (2001) ("With age ... environmental law in
the United States is also beginning to lose some of its color and its passion. Judges no longer routinely
view environmental concerns as special, warranting enhanced judicial protection, but instead view them
merely as another special interest in the lawmaking process. Environmental policymakers increasingly
emphasize that environmental issues do not present clear black-and-white options or stark choices
between good and evil. Instead they present difficult, grayer choices of social policy in the face of
tremendous scientific uncertainty regarding environmental risk and the economic costs of pollution
reduction. Incremental reform is occurring based on the need for less absolutism, greater compromise,
and increased accommodation of competing concerns. Finally, those who practice environmental law
are more and more those who view it as a mere menu of terms of legal compliance rather than the result
of a legal revolution."); Thomas 0. McGarity, Deflecting the Assault: How EPA Survived a Disorganized Revolution By Reinventing Itself a Bit, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. II, 249 (2001) (detailing the failed
Republican efforts at reform).
6. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 18 REG., No. I, at 84 (1995) (reviewing DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION
(1993)).
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like-minded individuals may have a significant role to play in restoring the
Constitution-in-exile.
In the very same year in which Judge Ginsburg made his dramatic appeal to
recapture the Constitution-in-exile, the United States Supreme Court seemed to
take a dramatic step in that very direction when, in United States v. Lopez, 7 it
struck down a federal regulation of private activity for violating the scope of the
Commerce Clause 8 for the first time in six decades. 9 At the time, no constitutional scholar had the temerity to claim Lopez signified the beginning of a
revolution. Yet environmental scholars reacted differently, for the most part,
particularly with respect to developments relating to the Takings Clause. 10
Shortly after Lopez, Professor Molly McUsic declared:
The similarity between the Court's current jurisprudence and the Lochner
jurisprudence lies not in the amount or type of legislation at risk but the
proportion of redistributive legislation put at risk. The Lochner-era jurisprudence targeted the major redistributive initiatives of liberal majorities in the
late 1800s and early 1900s, primarily labor legislation, the regulation of
prices, graduated taxes, and restrictions on entry into business. This Court's
[Takings] jurisprudence targets the far more limited liberal agenda of the last twenty
years .... The fresh redistributive efforts of this era are embodied in laws such as
environmental regulations, local land use regulations, and tenant protection lawsthe very laws under constitutional attack in the takings doctrine. 11

If one needed more evidence of an impending revolution, one could find it in
President William Jefferson Clinton's declaration within a year of Lopez that
"the era of big government is over." 12 Coming from a president whose party
was responsible for the New Deal and the Great Society, President Clinton's
declaration signaled the possibility of the dawning of a new era. Indeed, the
Republican leadership in control of the very Congress before which President
Clinton made his declaration desired to bring about the dawning of a new age of
constitutional law. Many of these desires seem to have been fulfilled over the
past six years. By 1999, the Republican leadership had achieved more than
sixty-nine percent of the goals of the Contract with America, 13 while two other

7. 514 u.s. 549 (1995).
8. U.S. CoNsT. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3.
9. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-68.
10. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
11. Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modem Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic
Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 608-09 (1996); see also Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out:
Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 591 (1998) (discussing alternative
approach to analysis of modern Takings Clause jurisprudence).
12. William J. Clinton, State of the Union I996: The Age of Possibility, 62 VITAL SPEECHES DAY 258,
258 (1996).
13. Gerald M. Pomper, Parliamentary Government in the United States?, in THE STATE OF THE
PARTIES: THE CHANGING RoLE OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PARTIES 251, 258-60 (John C. Green &
Daniel M. Shea eds., 3d ed. 1999). In the fall of 1994, the Republican leadership proposed the Contract
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prominent goals of the Contract-a substantial tax cut and increases in defense
expenditures-were met by the beginning of 2002. The most notable of the still
unenacted provisions of the Contract are those dealing with federal regulation of
environmental matters. 14 Moreover, the Supreme Court has struck down twentyeight federal laws over the past six years. 15 One has to go back at least as far as
the Lochner era to find a period in our history in which the Court has overturned
a comparable number of federal laws. In other words, one needs to visit the very
period in which the Constitution was presumably exiled to find a comparable
period of judicial activism.
Interestingly, these developments have thus far caused at most only a modest
ripple in constitutional analysis. One reason is that the field lacks a topology of
revolution. 16 Only one constitutional scholar, Bruce Ackerman, has put forward
with America in exchange for Americans' electing a majority of Republicans to both the House and the
Senate. Republicans promised their newly elected leadership in Congress would introduce a series of
legislative reforms that, if enacted, would restore the American people's faith in the Congress and
Congress's accountability. These proposed reforms included a balanced budget amendment, the Taking
Back Our Streets Act, the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act, and term limits.
14. The other provision of the Contract with America not yet adopted then was congressional term
limits, the imposition of which would require a constitutional amendment. See United States Term
Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
15. Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority of One, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 3, 2001, at 32. This degree of judicial
activism has not gone completely unnoticed. In a promising development, environmental scholar Chris
Schroeder organized a symposium dedicated to assessing the significance of the Court's recent
federalism decisions for recovering the Constitution-in-exile. See Symposium, The Constitution-inExile, 51 DuKE L.J. 1 (2001).
16. Constitutional scholarship lacks consensus on both a lexicon for and theory of revolution. A
notable contrast is Thomas Kuhn's influential classic on the structure of scientific revolutions. THOMAS
S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996). Kuhn demonstrated that the work of
science is socially constructed much like other human endeavors, such as art and politics. He found that
scientific communities used paradigms to organize their problem-solving efforts. In what he described
as normal science, practitioners who "have undergone similar educations and professional limitations"
use their shared paradigm as the determinant of "legitimate methods, problems, and standards of
solution." !d. at 177. In normal science, the community rejects ideas inconsistent with the paradigm,
often without evaluating their significance. At the same time that a paradigm constrains discourse, its
problem-solving nature ensures the paradigm's eventual demise. The task of problem solving will
inevitably result in identification of a problem that is not susceptible to problem-solving efforts under
the paradigm. That problem becomes an "anomaly" that provokes a crisis. !d. at 6. A time of crisis is
one of "extraordinary science" when the paradigm itself comes into question. /d. at 82. In this "period
of pronounced professional insecurity," consensus regarding the constitution of the governing paradigm
disintegrates, proposals for new paradigms proliferate, and the community turns to philosophy as it
revisits first principles. /d. at 67-68. When the scientific community cannot resolve the crisis by solving
the problem under the paradigm or bracketing the problem for the future, it resolves the old paradigm
with a new one in what Kuhn calls a revolution. The new paradigm proposes to "solve the problems
that have led the old one to a crisis." /d. at 153. Whether the new paradigm succeeds in a revolution
depends more on the power of conversion than logical argument. No "logical" choice is available
between competing paradigms that "disagree about what is a problem and what a solution." !d. at 109.
Newer members of the community tend to be more open to new paradigms and more senior members
tend to be more resistant. A revolution completes itself once the new generation outnumbers the
old-"a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the
light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and new generation grows up that is familiar with
it." /d. at 224 (quoting MAX PLANCK, SciENTIFIC AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER PAPERS 33-34 (Frank
Gaynor trans., Philosophical Library 1949)).
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a grand theory of constitutional change, 17 though no one else agrees fully with
his methodology. 18 Ackerman has taken great pains to demonstrate how the
Court's recent activity does not constitute or portend a revolution in American
constitutionallaw. 19 In contrast, Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson construe the
same activity as the culmination of a "constitutional revolution" by means of
"partisan entrenchment."20 Another prominent constitutional scholar, Mark Tushnet, construes the Court's recent activity as signaling the end, rather than the
beginning, of a constitutional order.Z 1
In this Essay, I attempt to bridge the gap in environmental and constitutional
commentary on impending revolution. I consider the requisite conditions for
revolution; whether they are being fulfilled in contemporary American constitutional law; and what current conditions relating to possible revolution portend
for environmental law, particularly wetlands regulation. The vast majority of
scholars, environmental or constitutional-have not yet posed-much less answered, this series of questions. Some environmental scholars talk of the
possibility of revolution, but not in terms of any coherent theory of revolution,

17. According to Professor Ackerman, there have been three noteworthy "moments" of constitutional change-the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal. These three moments are distinctive
because in each of them the American people, working in conjunction with the leaders of all three
branches of the federal government, countenanced enduring changes in the Constitution that deviated
from the formal provisions for constitutional amendment set forth in Article V of the Constitution. In
Ackerman's view, these changes followed a pattern consisting of five stages-signaling, public shaping
of proposals of change, triggering, ratification, and consolidation. See 2 BRUCE A. AcKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 40-65 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE]. For a critical overview of Ackerman's ambitious theory, see Michael 1. Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest for a Common
Law of Higher Lawmaking, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1731 (1999). Ackerman is also distinctive for
being one of the few constitutional scholars who has also written about environmental law. See, e.g.,
BRUCE A. AcKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974); Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market
Incentives, 13 CoLUM. 1. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988). For three other constitutional scholars who also have
bridged the fields of constitutional and environmental law, see DANIEL A. FARBER, Eco-PRAGMATISM:
MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999), Cass R. Sunstein, /s the
Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REv. 303 (1999), and William Michael Treanor, The
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782
(1995).
18. For a symposium covering a wide variety of different views of Ackerman's theory of constitutional change, see Symposium, supra note 3.
19. See Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2340-47 (1999)
(explaining why the so-called Republican Revolution of the 1990s was not a revolution in constitutional law).
20. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L.
REv. 1045, 1066 (2001). Balkin and Levinson explain that "[p]artisan entrenchment is an especially
important engine of constitutional change. When enough members of a particular [political] party are
appointed to the federal judiciary, they start to change the understandings of the Constitution that
appear in positive law. If more people are appointed in a relatively short period of time, the changes
will occur more quickly. Constitutional revolutions are the cumulative result of successful partisan
entrenchment when the entrenching party has a relatively coherent political ideology or can pick up
sufficient ideological allies from the appointees of other parties." !d. at 1067-68.
21. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Foreword: The New Constitutional
Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REv. 29, 31 ( 1999).
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while some constitutional scholars debate theories of revolutionary change, but
rarely incorporate within their analyses developments that cut across the wide
expanse of constitutional adjudication. In my view, a revolution in constitutional law would entail three elements: (1) a significant shift in fundamental
constitutional understanding or law that (2) is supported at the highest levels of
all three branches of the national government and (3) is enduring. All three of
these elements must be satisfied in order for a genuine constitutional revolution
to occur.
However, none of the developments in constitutional law over the past few
decades satisfy any of these three elements. For instance, I see no new ideology
implemented with the blessings of all three branches of the national government, at least to the extent of restoring something as sweeping as a Constitutionin-exile.22 The activity of late in constitutional law, as developed by all the
branches and the states, largely consists of fortifying certain national powers
and otherwise defining outer boundaries to the pre-existing constitutional order
rather than forming a new constitutional regime. Prior to the formation of a new
constitutional order, the preceding regime must end, and the old order must be
dismantled. Though there are some signs of dismantlement, they lack any clear
direction, much less a direction in favor of rejecting core provisions and
entitlements of the New Deal and Great Society as they have generally come to
be understood. Nor is there any reason to suppose that to the extent these have
arguably been changes in constitutional understandings the altered state of
constitutional law is enduring.
In Part I of the Essay, I briefly consider the requisite conditions for a
revolution in constitutional law. These entail three elements, which can be
collectively understood as requiring that the leadership of all three branches of
the national government unify around both a significant and enduring shift in
the direction of constitutional law. None of the current developments in constitutional law satisfy any of these elements. Nor, for that matter, is there any
consensus among the institutional leaders of all three branches or shift in
constitutional understandings or practices either underway or on the horizon.
In Part II, I explain why the Supreme Court's two most recent decisions
overturning environmental regulations, including the controversial Migratory
Bird Rule, 23 do not signal revolutionary change. In neither decision does the
Court develop new doctrine, nor does the Court deploy radical extensions or
interpretations of existing doctrine. Moreover, the Court leaves untouched some
critical features of the present constitutional order. To the extent that the
existing order seems destined to change, the change depends on the Court's
resolution of three tensions in Commerce Clause doctrine concerning the respec22. I refer to "a Constitution-in-exile" for a reason. There is no apparent consensus among
conservative or Republican scholars, pundits, and leaders on (I) what such a constitution would look
like, and (2) how it could be implemented. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitution-in-Exile and the
Crisis in Constitutional Theory (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
23. 33 C.F.R. §§ 320-30 (2001).
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tive boundaries between: (1) national subjects appropriate for federal regulation
and localized activities that only states may regulate, (2) econorhic activities
that may be aggregated in assessing impact on interstate commerce and noneconomic activities that may not be aggregated, and (3) regulatory schemes whose
comprehensiveness reflects a substantial relationship to interstate commerce and
those which lack such comprehensiveness. Even if all of these tensions were to
be resolved in ways that limit federal authority and preserve state sovereignty, 24
the ensuing doctrine would likely reflect, at most, the demarcation of the outer
boundaries of the existing constitutional order.
In the final Part, I examine the significance of federal and state responses to
the Court's decision overturning the controversial Migratory Bird Rule. These
responses do not confirm a revolution in American environmental law generally,
much less in the realm of wetlands regulation. Indeed, federal and state authorities are trying to fill the void left by the Court's decision. This activity indicates
further more of a fine-tuning of the constitutional status quo rather than its
abandonment. When one further considers these developments combined with
the federal government's aggressive war against terrorism and ambitious new
program on education, 25 it is clear that national authorities are fortifying many
aspects of the existing constitutional regime and not engaging in a revolution to
restore or implement a radically different constitutional order.
I.

CoNSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION

It is not possible to assess the revolutionary significance of any of the Court's
recent environmental decisions, including last Term's dramatic overturning of
the Migratory Bird Rule, 26 without initially pondering what a constitutional
revolution entails. The most common definition is the process by which certain
elites-presumably the leaders of national political institutions-seek to radically change a constitutional order. 27 One problem with such elite management
is that it is unclear which institutional leaders-and therefore whose activitiesare relevant for predicting revolutionary change. Another problem is that the
efforts of these elites may not produce outcomes that they either desired or
expected. Yet another problem is the absence of consensus over which outcomes
even qualify as revolutionary. For example, consider two events the significance
of which as revolutions are commonly debated: constitutional changes surrounding the Civil War and the New Deal. No doubt, the Civil War and its aftermath,
including the adoption of three significant constitutional amendments, is hard to

24. See discussion infra section II.D.
25. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
26. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001 ).
27. Ackerman, supra note 19, at 2279 (describing "a model of elite management [in which] the
analyst eavesdrops on elite deliberations to determine and critique the way objectives are defined ....
[and] then considers the factors that facilitate and frustrate elite efforts to shape social reality, before
reaching a final causal and normative assessment").
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characterize as falling short of a revolution in constitutionallaw.Z 8 Nevertheless,
many scholars still debate what the revolution entailed, including its beginning
and especially its end.Z9 Similarly, something dramatic obviously occurred in
and around the year 1937 in Commerce Clause doctrine, though constitutional
scholars continue to debate not only what happened but whether it constitutes a
genuine revolution. 30
In 1980, President Reagan began an eight-year incumbency during which he
challenged the interest group-dominated institutions of the New Deal-Great
Society order. 31 While there are some clear signs that this order is ending or
already over, 32 I agree with Professor Tushnet that it is "less clear ... that the
New Deal system has been replaced with a coherent new political and constitutional system, rather than with a random collection of institutions and decisions
lacking any unifying theme.'m While Tushnet ultimately suggests that a new
constitutional order has been implemented, 34 I reject his conclusion. 35 To be
sure, regime transformation requires, as Stephen Skowronek suggests, a President to articulate the principles of a new constitutional order and to begin the
process of institutional transformation that will ultimately produce a new constitutional regime. 36 President Reagan undoubtedly tried to begin such a transfor28. Initial contemporary doubt about the significance of Reconstruction was reflected in the Supreme
Court's decision in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
29. For some different viewpoints on the meaning and significance of Reconstruction, see, for
example, AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 17, at 173-78, 187-91 (arguing, inter alia, that a series
of presidential and congressional actions in the 1860s constituted special "constitutional moment" in
which enduring constitutional changes relating to civil rights took effect); Gerhardt, supra note 17 at
1759-66 (questioning the extent of the constitutional revolution Ackerman claims took place in the
1860s and 1870s); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CaNST. CoMMENT.
115 (1994) (suggesting there was a possible constitutional moment to undo Reconstruction in contrast
to Ackerman's account of Reconstruction consolidation).
30. For two different views, compare AcKERMAN, WE THE PEoPLE, supra note 17, at 279-311
(describing the New Deal as a revolutionary constitutional "moment"), with G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000) (suggesting that in 1937 the Court did not make a radical break
with the past but rather resolved a struggle among the Justices of the Supreme Court to come to terms
with the application of the Due Process and Commerce Clause to the modem world).
31. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL
CLINTON 415-29 (1997) (analyzing the significance and success of Ronald Reagan's efforts as the "great
repudiator").
32. See, e.g., THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEw DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle
eds., 1989).
33. Tushnet, supra note 21, at 30.
34. !d. at 33 (suggesting the existence of a new constitutional order "in which the aspiration of
achieving justice directly through law has been substantially chastened" and in which 'justice is to be
achieved not by national legislation identifying and seeking to promote it, but by individual responsibility and market processes").
35. Tushnet claims that the new constitutional order's distinguishing characteristics include major
declines in both public participation in and the influence of political parties over politics. /d. at 43.
These declines have had many consequences, including but not limited to allowing "relatively small
groups of voters" to "dominat[e] national politics," weak party organizations, and an apparent preference among most of the voting public for divided government (ensuing in generally chastened
aspirations for the national government). /d.
36. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 36-38.
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mation, and President Clinton's triangulation could be construed as helping to
consolidate what President Reagan started; 37 however, it is a major mistake to
read too much into President Clinton's rhetoric. A more accurate understanding
of Clinton's presidency is to see it either as he intended it or in terms of the
consequences of his actions: He tried to oppose any further erosion of the old
New Deal-Great Society constitutional order, and he was essentially successfue8
As described by Skowronek, the hallmark of President Clinton's "third-way
politics" was that it was "preemptive rather than reconstructive. While suggesting of a new middle ground, his third way, as a practical matter, was located on
a field largely defined by his opponents, and this ... infused his opposition
stance with an indeterminate, ad hoc character." 39 In other words, many of
President Clinton's efforts, such as preserving millions of acres of federal land
as national monuments40 and issuing an executive order to require all federal
agencies to coordinate with the National Wildlife Service to develop protocols
for the protection of migratory birds, 41 were not designed to end big government but rather to frustrate efforts to undo the New Deal-Great Society order.
Without national leaders uniformly building on the Reagan rhetoric to dismantle the New Deal and Great Society, one of the necessary ingredients of
revolutionary change in the constitutional order is absent. For a revolution to
occur, one essential element is that it must occur openly, indeed brazenly across
the spectrum of national leadership. It must reflect not only the support of the
leadership of all three branches of the federal government for radical change but
also the explicit acknowledgment by each of the leaders of those institutions.
The second essential element is that the leadership of all three branches must
support a significant break with or shift from existing constitutional understandings, and the third critical element is that this shift must be enduring. In other
words, a constitutional revolution requires all three branches to come together
in support of enduring change. Such was the case with the New Deal programs
of the 1930s and 1940s and the Great Society programs of the 1960s. In each of
these eras, the Democrats came to dominate the leadership of all three branches. 42

37. See Michael Kelly, The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats: Clinton Says He Is Not Leaning Left
But Taking a New 'Third Way', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1992, at A7; see also David Dahl, Old or New
Democrat, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at lA (evaluating President Clinton's performance
throughout his first term against his "third-way" pledge).
38. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 448-49 (describing the significance of Clinton's "third-way
politics").
39. !d. at 449.
40. See infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
41. Responsibilities of Federal Agencies to Protect Migratory Birds, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,853 (Jan. 10,
2001).
42. Of course, there is serious disagreement about the significance of the Court's decision in West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (employing a deferential rational basis test to assess
the constitutionality of state economic regulations under the Due Process Clause), which was decided
while Republican appointees still dominated the Court. Nevertheless, my point is that whatever
happened in that particular decision, its real significance is not apparent standing alone. The decision
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Each era was also ultimately marked by concerted, or convergent, action of the
leaders of all three branches in support of a clear constitutional ideology that
continues to endure. 43
At present, no such unification seems apparent, much less possible. The
Republicans did control all three branches for a few months at the beginning of
the presidency of George W. Bush, but they no longer do. 44 Moreover, when
one branch balks at what the other two are trying to do, much as the Rehnquist
Court apparently did in Lopez45 and United States v. Morrison, 46 the most that
can be said is that the deviant institution-the Court-is refusing to uphold an
expansion of the old order. Indeed, the present Court appears to be resisting
further implementation or expansion of some aspects of an old constitutional
order, rather than establishing a new one. The point can be made more dramatically: of the twenty-eight federal laws struck down by the Supreme Court as
unconstitutional over the past six years, not a single one involved any provision
or entitlement that could fairly be described as falling within the core of the
New Deal or the Great Society. 47 Nor has a single one of the legislative

alone did not secure the foundations of the New Deal but instead was merely one step in a process that
was completed (or, in Ackerman's word, consolidated) subsequently when Democratic appointees
joined the Court. In his second term, President Roosevelt appointed five Justices to the Supreme Court.
These appointments were crucial for emphatically removing any doubt about the firmness of the
foundations of the New Deal.
43. By 1968, there was significant social and political backlash to the Great Society. See lAMEST.
PATIERSON, GRAND EXPECfATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974, at 676--77 (1997) (describing the
relatively widespread backlash in American society to the Great Society, which "exposed a fragmentation of society and culture that seemed if anything to grow in the next thirty years .... [The b]acklash
also threatened the Democratic party. This had been apparent as early as the 1964 and 1966 elections,
and it grew more ominous as the presidential election of 1968 approached. Many Americans blamed
Johnson and the Democratic party not only for mismanaging the Vietnam War but also for creating the
social turmoil that disturbed the nation after 1965. They especially resented liberals .... In an
increasingly fragmented and polarized society these angry people were a political force to be reckoned
with").
44. On May 24, 2001, Senator James Jeffords announced that he would leave the Republican party
to become an independent and that, as an independent, he would vote to support the Democrats in
organizing the leadership of the Senate. With the Democrats in control of the Senate, it is inconceivable
that Congress would support any significant cutback in the scope of federal environmental law. The
Democrats in the Senate are simply opposed to any such cutback. Thus, the possibility of a revolution
to be led by President Bush, if there ever was one, ended less than four months from the date of his
inauguration.
45. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Environmental Regulation in a Post-Lopez World: Some
Questions and Answers, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,980, 10,981-82 (2000).
46. 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) (striking down the civil remedy provisions of the Violence Against
Women Act).
47. Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson construe the implications of recent decisions differently;
they suggest that "[w]e are in the middle of a paradigm shift that has changed the way people write,
think, and teach about American constitutional law." Balkin & Levinson, supra note 20, at 1051. In
their view, "[i]n the past ten years, the Supreme Court of the United States has begun a systematic
reappraisal of doctrines concerning federalism, racial equality, and civil rights that, if fully successful,
will redraw the constitutional map as we have known it." Id. at 1052-53. They recognize, however,
"[a]t least up until now, the Court's federalism decisions have more struck an ideological blow for
limited federal government than truly put a significant damper on federal regulatory power. As scholars

2002]

ON REVOLUTION AND WETLAND REGULATIONS

2153

enactments the Court has struck down as unconstitutional in the past six years
been an environmental regulation. 48 While the Migratory Bird Rule decision
involved the invalidation of a federal environmental regulation on statutory
grounds, 49 I will argue in the next Part that this decision signals neither the end
of the old order nor the implementation of a new one.
II.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOLID WASTE AGENCY V. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

In this part, I analyze the Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers 50 decision along two lines-the first is statutory, and the second is
constitutional. The first involves examining the Court's approach to two important doctrines in modem statutory construction (the nondelegation doctrine51
and Chevron deference 52 ), while the second involves considering the likely
direction of Commerce Clause doctrine in the aftermath of the decision. Before
I begin both lines of analysis, I briefly describe the opinion and its dissent.
A. SOLID WASTE AGENCY

The case involved the attempt of the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County (Solid Waste Agency), a consortium of Illinois municipalities, to use a
533-acre area as a depository for municipal waste. 53 The consortium applied to
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for a permit under section
404 of the Clean Water Ace 4 to fill a substantial number of acres of ponds and
small lakes on the property. 55 After the Corps denied the requested permit
because migratory birds use the ponds and lakes as habitat, the consortium
challenged the Corps's jurisdiction over those ponds and lakes. 5 6
The Seventh Circuit rejected the challenge. In an opinion by Judge Diane
Wood, the court held that the Corps had jurisdiction over the intrastate ponds
on both the right and left have demonstrated, a Court truly committed to reinvigorating state autonomy
must engage in far more active monitoring of conditional federal spending, the series of doctrines
through which the federal government can get states to do things by threatening to withhold federal
funds." /d. at 1058. They also recognize "[a]ny significant reinvigoration of state autonomy would also
require a reversal of the present capacious notions of preemption." /d. at 1059. I not only concur with
these latter acknowledgments but also point to the current agendas of national and state political leaders
as fortifying important elements of the existing constitutional order.
48. During this period of arguable judicial activism, the Court has overturned only a single
Commerce Clause precedent. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist's
Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 429,433,433 n.l8 (2002). Moreover, the only federal
environmental regulations struck down during this period have been overturned on statutory grounds.
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
49. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 166-73.
50. 531 u.s. 159 (2001).
51. See discussion infra section II.s.
52. See discussion infra section II.c.
53. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 162-63.
54. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
55. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 163.
56. See id. at 165.
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and lakes at issue because (1) those waters were used as a habitat for migratory
birds, (2) destroying the habitat and thus reducing the population of migratory
birds would substantially affect interstate commerce (because it would harm
bird-watching and hunting businesses dependent on the birds' existence), and
(3) protecting the habitat was within Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause. 57 The Solid Waste Agency petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and the
Supreme Court granted the petition58 and reversed the Seventh Circuit. 5 9
Writing for the five-member majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist first reviewed
the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions. 60 While recognizing that the
purpose of the Clean Water Act was "'restor[ing] and maintain[ing] ... the
Nation's waters,"' 61 he explained the Court's finding that the term "navigable
waters" constituted the basis for the Corps's jurisdiction under the act and held
that waters that are neither navigable waters nor adjacent to navigable waters
are simply not within the Corps's jurisdiction. 62 Thus, the Solid Waste Agency
needed no Corps permit to fill in the lakes and ponds for its municipal waste
depository. 63
The Chief Justice distinguished the Court's earlier, unanimous opinion in
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 64 on the ground that the Corps
had jurisdiction over the wetlands at issue in the latter case because the
wetlands abutted a navigable waterway, whereas the ponds at issue in Solid
Waste Agency were not "adjacent to open water." 65 To allow jurisdiction to
extend to a nonnavigable pond, the Court figured, would "read[] the term
'navigable' out of the statute." 66

57. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F. 3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999).
58. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 529 U.S. 1129 (2000).
59. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (200 I).
60. !d. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion noted that section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act
"grants the Corps authority to issue permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters at specified disposal sites," and that the Act defines "navigable waters" as '"waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas."' !d. at 163 (quoting 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(7)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999)). The Chief Justice then quoted the Corps's regulation defining the term
'"waters of the United States"' as '"waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams ... or natural ponds,
the ... destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce."' !d. (quoting 33 C.F.R.
§ 328(a)(3) (Supp. V 1999)). Finally, the Court quoted the Corps's Migratory Bird Rule, under which
the Corps asserted jurisdiction over intrastate waters '"[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by birds
protected by Migratory Bird treaties; ... [w]hich are or would be used as habitat by other migratory
birds which cross state lines; ... [w]hich are or would be used as habitat for endangered species;
or ... [u]sed to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.'" !d. at 164 (quoting 33 C.F.R. §§ 320...30
(2001)). The most controversial assertions of jurisdiction made within the Migratory Bird Rule were
those covering intrastate waters "used as habitat by birds protected by the Migratory Bird Treaties" or
"used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines." 33 C.F.R. §§ 320...30 (2001).
61. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 166 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 125l(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
62. ld. at 166--68.
63. See id. at 165.
64. 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985) (holding that the Corps's interpretation ofnavigab1e waters to include
wetlands adjacent to navigable water ways was reasonable).
65. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 166--68.
66. ld. at 172.
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The Court further explained the majority's reluctance to accept the EPA's
arguments that Congress, in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act, was
aware of the Corps's expansive definition of "navigable waters" and had
acquiesced in that definition by rejecting a House of Representatives bill
confining that term to waters that are "susceptible" to use for transporting
interstate or foreign commerce and by adopting section 404(g), which specifically referred to "navigable waters." 67
The Chief Justice also explained the Court's holding that the Corps's construction of its jurisdiction failed to satisfy the first prong of Chevron analysis, under
which the Court defers to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute. 68 The problem with the Migratory Bird Rule was that it "push[ed] the
limit of congressional authority." 69 The Chief Justice noted that the Court's
"concern is heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the federalstate framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state
power." 7 ° Citing his previous opinions in Morrison and Lopez, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated, "Twice in the past six. years we have reaffirmed the proposition that the grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though
broad, is not unlimited." 71 He elaborated that "[p]ermitting respondents to claim
federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird
Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and
primary power over land and water use.'m
On behalf of himself and three other justices, Justice Stevens dissented. 73 His
dissent challenged the Court's interpretation of the Clean Water Act and the
Court's refusal to grant Chevron deference to the Corps's interpretation of it.
The dissent examined the history of the definitions of the key statutory terms
"navigable waters" and "waters of the United States"-the crucial jurisdictional
terms of the Clean Water Act. Justice Stevens explained that in the 1972 Act and
the 1977 amendments, Congress diverged from its traditional role of regulating
discharges into the nation's waterways to protect their use as highways for
commerce and focused instead on protecting the quality of waters for "esthetic,

67. /d. at 169-72. Section 404(g) is codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(J) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The
section provides, in relevant part: "The Governor of any State desiring to administer its own individual
and general permit program for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters (other
than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condition or by
reasonable improvement as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce ... , including wetlands adjacent thereto) within its jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator a full and complete
description of the program it proposes to establish and administer under State law or under an interstate
compact." /d.
68. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172 (discussing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
69. /d. at 173.
70. /d.
71. /d.
72. /d. at 174.
73. /d. at 174 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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health, recreational and environmental uses." 74 Thus, Congress deleted the term
"navigable" from the definition of "waters of the United States" and no longer
required either actual or potential navigability as a basis for the Corps's
jurisdiction. 75 In the dissenters' opinion, the Court had recognized and approved
Congress's acquiescence in the Corps's broad definition of its jurisdiction in the
Court's broad ruling in Riverside Bayview Homes. 76 And "once Congress
crossed the legal watershed that separates navigable streams of commerce from
marshes and inland lakes, there is no principled reason for limiting the statute's
protection to those waters or wetlands that happen to lie near a navigable
stream." 77
In addressing the majority's federalism argument, the dissenters pointed out
that the Corps's interpretation of the Clean Water Act did not encroach on the
traditional state power over land use because environmental law does not
mandate particular uses of land but requires only that the use of the land not
unduly damage the national environment. 78 The dissent then analyzed the
Migratory Bird Rule under the Lopez test, which outlines three categories of
activity that Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause power, and
stated that the activity in this case-discharge of fill into water-fell squarely
within the third category: activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce.79 Moreover, the dissent noted, "protection of migratory birds is a
textbook example of a national problem," not a merely local issue. 80
B. SOLID WASTE AGENCY AND THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

To begin with, one may wonder, "why talk about the nondelegation doctrine81 at all, as the case says nothing about it!" That's precisely my point. The
problem in the case had nothing to do with the delegation of authority to the
Corps. The Court never questions whether Congress could make delegations to
the Corps; hence, the case implicitly accepts the continued legitimacy of the
modem understanding of the nondelegation doctrine. The problem in the case
concerned the Corps's interpretation of its delegated authority, not whether
authority could be delegated to the Corps in the first place.
Understood from this point of view, the case is consistent with the Court's
other significant environmental decision of the Term, Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'ns. 82 In an important portion of that decision, the Court unani74. /d. at 175.
75. Id. at 180-81.
76. /d. at 176.
77. /d.
78. /d. at 191.
79. Id. at 192.
80. /d. at 195.
81. Under the nondelegation doctrine, delegations are acceptable as long as an "intelligble principle"
is provided to the agency receiving the delegated power. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361,372 (1989).
82. 531 u.s. 457 (2001).

2002]

ON REVOLUTION AND WETLAND REGULATIONS

2157

mously reversed the D.C. Circuit's unusual application of the nondelegation
doctrine-used to strike down the EPA's most recent revision of the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards. 83 In reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme
Court stated that the scope of discretion that Congress accorded to the EPA to
set forth standards for ground-level ozone and particulate matter "is in fact well
within the outer limits of our nondelegation precedents." 84
Justice Scalia noted that the Court had found the requisite "intelligible
principle" lacking in only two federal statutes, both times in 1935, and that
the Court has '"almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law. "' 85 Further, he stated that "even in sweeping
regulatory schemes we have never demanded ... that statutes provide a
'determinate criterion' for saying 'how much [of the regulated harm] is too
much. "' 86 I cannot say that the Court will refuse to revisit the nondelegation
doctrine at some future date, but for the time being this language sounds as if
this Court has shut the door on any such argument. Moreover, Solid Waste
Agency suggests no different outcome in the context of the Clean Water Act. In
short, there is no sign of a revolution thus far in the realm of environmental
regulation. 87
C. CHEVRON DEFERENCE

The Supreme Court's refusal to defer to the Corps's construction of its
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act88 raises a question about whether Solid
Waste Agency involves a radical departure from the usual approach to Chevron
deference. In particular, the question is whether the Court, in spite of its

83. As precedent for this unusual ruling, the D.C. Circuit relied on the nondelegation doctrine set
forth in the 1935 case A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), which
invalidated New Deal poultry regulations.
84. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474.
85. /d. at 474-75 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416).
86. !d. at 475 (quoting American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
87. The two other issues addressed in American Trucking concerned the EPA's authority to implement the revised ozone standard in areas where ozone levels currently exceed the maximum level
permitted by that standard. First, the Court rejected the EPA's argument that the appellate court had no
jurisdiction to review the EPA's implementation policy because that policy was not final agency action.
!d. at 479. Second, on the merits of the implementation issue the Court held that the statutory provision
at issue was sufficiently unclear that the EPA had discretion to interpret it, but that the EPA's
interpretation was unreasonable and the EPA's implementation policy was thus unlawful. /d. at 481-86.
Accordingly, the Court remanded this second issue. !d. at 486.
It is probably not a coincidence that in both American Trucking and Solid Waste Agency the Court's
skepticism over the reasonableness of agency constructions of delegated authority led to the same
outcome-striking down federal environmental regulations under the first step of Chevron analysis.
This outcome reflects the Court's resistance to expansive construction of and deference to contested
federal exercises of authority. Nevertheless, the Court's approach in both cases avoided constitutional
issues and, in American Trucking, included the significant step of unanimously embracing the modem
understanding of the nondelegation doctrine. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
88. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 16{K)8 (2001).
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adherence to Chevron deference in principle, may nevertheless have recognized
an important exception by requiring clear congressional authorization for agency
interpretations of statutes that would stretch congressional authority to its outer
limits and impinge on traditional state functions. 89 The Court's refusal to accept
the EPA's interpretation as a reasonable interpretation of the governing federal
statute, however, is not unique. The Chevron doctrine requires two analytical
steps. The first step asks whether Congress has "directly spoken to the precise
question at issue,"90 or if the statute interpreted by the agency is "silent or
ambiguous." 91 If the Court concludes that the statute is "silent or ambiguous"
with respect to the interpretive question at issue after employing the usual tools
of statutory construction, then the reviewing court proceeds to the second
step, which is to ask whether the agency's interpretation of the statute is
"reasonable" or "permissible."92 Step one is usually the critical step in Chevron
analysis. Indeed, in a study of the Chevron doctrine in 1997, Professor Ronald
Levin concluded that "the Court has not proved to be much more deferential in
the post-Chevron era than it was before; but when it utilizes the Chevron
framework, it either upholds the agency or reverses on the strength of step
one." 93
Earlier in the same term as Solid Waste Agency, the Court similarly refused to
accept the FDA's interpretation of its jurisdiction as extending to the regulation
of tobacco as a drug in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 94 Solid
Waste Agency and Brown & Williamson are alike in the Court's unequivocal
embrace of the Chevron doctrine and in its refusal to question either the basic
legitimacy of Congress delegating to federal agencies or of federal agencies
exercising delegated authority. 95 A significant theme shared by the two cases is
the Court's refusal to allow an extension of federal authority by means of
statutory construction or agency action beyond a certain point-a point that
would either exceed the scope of constitutional authority vested in Congress or
invade a constitutionally protected domain, such as state sovereignty. Perhaps
most importantly, this theme does not emerge through radical or implausible
applications of current doctrine. To the contrary, agency action is held to exceed

89. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
90. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
91. !d. at 843.
92. !d. at 842-44.
93. Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHL-KENT L. REv. 1253,
1261 (1997).
94. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). For another recent decision, see National Credit Union Administration v.
First National Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998) (holding that National Credit Union Administration did not have power to approve applications for expansion of Credit Union membership under
Federal Credit Union Act). For another case involving an environmental regulation, see City of Chicago
v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994) (holding that the regulatory scheme of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act addressed the issue of ash produced by resource recovery
facility's burning of municipal waste).
95. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132.
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the standards and rules of basic doctrine. 96 In other words, the Court refuses to
allow the extension of the present constitutional order beyond certain limits.
This hardly seems revolutionary because it does not constitute an attack on, or
rejection of, the basic order itself.
There is another way to construe the Court's approach to Chevron deference
as nonrevolutionary. To begin with, the Court's decision allowed it to refrain
from addressing the constitutionality of a delegated authority to extend federal
jurisdiction over isolated wetlands. 97 By avoiding the central constitutional
question that would be raised if Congress were to have enacted a regulation like
the Migratory Bird Rule, the Court took anything but a radical step. In fact, this
act was one of classic judicial restraint rather than revolution.
Moreover, one should note the Supreme Court's acceptance of Chevron
deference itself. Accepting Chevron deference strikes me as something quite at
odds with the dismantlement of the New Deal and Great Society. The very
existence of such deference is hard to square with the restoration of a Constitution-in-exile.98
The refusal to accord Chevron deference is no small matter, but is, as I have
indicated, hardly unprecedented. Indeed, the refusal is linked in Solid Waste
Agency, as it was in Brown & Williamson, 99 with a reluctance to allow federal
agencies to extend federal authority over areas that, in the majority's view, fall
within traditional state domains. 100 It is no great surprise to find the Court's
federalism concerns driving these decisions; 101 these of course are the very
96. I refer to both standards and rules because American Trucking seems to tum on the EPA's
violation of a standard (reasonableness) and Solid Waste Agency on the Corps's violation of a
rule-forbidding impingement on a state's sovereignty.
97. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001). The Court noted:
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress'
power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result ... This requirement
stems from our prudential desire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues and our
assumption that Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a
statute to push the limit of congressional authority .... This concern is heightened where the
administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power.... We thus read the statute as written to avoid the
significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents' interpretation, and
therefore reject the request for administrative deference.
/d. at 172-74 (internal citations omitted).
98. Cf supra notes 6, 15, 22 and accompanying text.
99. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 125-26.
100. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173-74.
10 I. A plausible contrary argument is that, at the very least, the Court sets forth a new principle--<Jr
at least a major exception to Chevron deference-that if Congress intends for an agency to have the

authority to operate at the outer limits of Congress's power, then Congress must "indicat[e that it]
intended that result." /d. at 171. This principle effectively defines an outer limit to the Chevron doctrine
itself. Ambiguity will not serve as a basis for some agency interpretations when those interpretations
exceed certain limits of congressional authority. Moreover, the only way for agencies to operate at the
outermost limits of congressional authority (as they have been defined by the Court) is under the
unlikely circumstance in which Congress expresses its legislative will clearly and boldly. Nevertheless,
at least one interesting reading of recent Commerce Clause decisions posits that they are likely to have
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same concerns driving the Court's recent Commerce Clause opm10ns. The
critical issue is the extent to which the concerns are driving the Court to develop
new standards or rules that will be used to produce revolutionary results, in
particular results that would restrict or overturn long-standing federal efforts to
protect the environment. I tum to the implications of these concerns for the
future of constitutional law in the next section.
D. THE FUTURE OF COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

The Court's explicit reference to federalism concerns is no accident. It is hard
not to appreciate the possibility that if Congress passed a law as far-reaching as
this regulation it would not survive constitutional muster. While the Court
stressed that Congress did not seem to authorize such extensive regulations as
the Migratory Bird Rule (perhaps implying that if the Congress had done so
clearly, the problem in the case would have been eliminated), the Court's
reference to the scope of state sovereignty extending over the land and activity
in question leaves very little to the imagination. 102
So, let's take the next step and suppose the Court were to strike down, as it
seems to imply it would, a federal law that had the same content as the
Migratory Bird Rule. On what basis would the Court strike down such a law,
and what would its decision tell us both about the direction of Commerce
Clause doctrine and about the possibility of a revolution in American constitutional law? The majority and dissenting opinions both allude to the basic issues
that would arise from a decision on the constitutionality of a federal law that
embodied the Migratory Bird Rule. There are three such issues. I will discuss
briefly the significance of each in tum.
1. National vs. Local Problems
One line of analysis in Solid Waste Agency involves the distinction between a
the unintended or perverse consequence of producing broader, more comprehensive enactments than
the ones struck down. See discussion infra section ll.o.3.
102. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173. The Court stated:
Respondents argue that the "Migratory Bird Rule" falls within Congress' power to regulate
intrastate activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce. They note that the protection of migratory birds is a "national interest of very nearly the first magnitude," ... and
that ... millions of people spend over a billion dollars annually on recreational pursuits
relating to migratory birds. These arguments raise significant constitutional questions. For
example, we would have to evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce. This is not clear, for although the Corps has claimed
jurisdiction over petitioner's land because it contains water areas used as habitat by migratory
birds, respondents now ... focus upon the fact that the regulated activity is petitioner's
municipal landfill, which is "plainly of a commercial nature." ... But this is a far cry, indeed,
from the "navigable waters" and "waters of the United States" to which the statute by its terms
extends.
/d. Moreover, the Court held that "[p]ermitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and

mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the
States' traditional and primary power over land and water use." /d. at 174.
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problem of national dimension, which would allow for congressional regulation, and a purely local problem, which would fall uniquely within state
sovereign authority to solve. For example, the majority refers to the respondents' argument "that the protection of migratory birds is a 'national interest of
very nearly the first magnitude,"' which cites Justice Holmes's famous opinion
in Missouri v. Holland. 103 In dissent, Justice Stevens refers to "Justice Holmes['s]
cogent[] observat[ion] in Missouri v. Holland that the protection of migratory
birds is a textbook example of a national problem." 104 He adds:
The destruction of aquatic migratory bird habitat, like so many other environmental problems, is an action in which the benefits (e.g., a new landfill) are
disproportionately local, while many of the costs (e.g., fewer migratory birds)
are widely dispersed and often borne by citizens living in other States. In such
situations, described by economists as involving "externalities," federal regulation is both appropriate and necessary. 105

In support of this conclusion, Justice Stevens relies in part on a 1981 decision in
which the Supreme Court "deferr[ed] to Congress' finding that nationwide
standards were 'essential' in order to avoid 'destructive interstate competition'
that might undermine environmental standards." 106
The national-local distinction is hardly new to Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 107 though it seems to have dissolved (at least for a while) with the advent
of the New Deal. The Court plainly evidences its own recognition of a local
condition that is beyond federal regulation by refusing to grant any deference to
the Corps's construction of its authority because it "would result in a significant
impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and water
use," after having considered but implicitly rejected respondents' appeal to the
"national" subject matter of the Migratory Bird Rule. 108 While the nationallocal distinction collapsed in part because of its very artificiality-and as a
result of the Court's recognition that Congress would be better able to figure out
whether something was a national problem requiring a national solution-the
Rehnquist Court seems disposed to come at this distinction from the direction of
clarifying what is not national rather than the direction of defining what ought to

103. ld. at 173 (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920)).
104. ld. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. ld. at 195-96 (citing Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
'Race-to-the-Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1222
(1992)).
106. !d. at 196 (citing Hodel v. Va. Suiface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281-82
(1981)).
107. The Taney Court first recognized the distinction in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299, 319 (1851) ("Whatever subjects of [the Commerce] power are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to
require exclusive legislation by Congress.").
108. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174.
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be treated as national. This is not a new direction for the Court. 109 The Court
undertook such an effort in National League of Cities v. Usery 110 (albeit
arguably dealing with a different problem-federal regulation of state activity).
But this is not a different matter from the Court's perspective, for here as in
National League of Cities, I am confident, especially given that the same Justice
wrote both opinions, that the Court has been trying to protect the very same
domain: state sovereignty. In environmental cases, the Court has recognized a
realm of local activity into which federal power may not extend, while in
National League of Cities the Court recognized a realm of state governmental
activities into which federal power may not extend. The Court's recognition of
formal realms into which federal power may not extend raises a question about
how bright or clear the national-local distinction is. While a majority may want
a very bright line, its brightness depends on the resolution of at least two other
issues.
2. Economic vs. Noneconomic Objective or Activity
As set forth in Lopez, the basic framework for evaluating the constitutionality
of Commerce Clause enactments allows Congress to regulate a channel of
interstate commerce (water, for example), an instrumentality of interstate commerce (a steamboat, for example), or an activity that could substantially affect
interstate commerce. 111 In United States v. Morrison, the Court indicated that
not every kind of private activity would be considered to have the potential to
affect interstate commerce substantially. The Court explained that the primary
kind of private activity that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to aggregate for purposes of determining whether it substantially affected interstate
commerce was "economic" activity. 112 In Morrison, the Court struck down the
civil remedies provision of the Violence Against Women Act because the
activity that it sought to regulate, gender-motivated violence, was "not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity." 113 The Court stated: "While we need
not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic
activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that
109. For support of its finding that the domain into which the Rule extends falls within the
sovereignty of the states, the Court quotes a 1994 decision. /d. at 174 ("Regulation of land use [is] a
function traditionally performed by local governments." (quoting Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corp., 513 U.S. 30,44 (1994))).
110. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (holding that the Commerce Clause did not empower Congress to
enforce the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act against the states
"in areas of traditional government functions").
111. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,559-60 (1995).
112. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608, 610-11 (2000) ("[T]he noneconomic, criminal
nature of the conduct at issue was central to [Lopez] ... Lopez's review of Commerce Clause case law
demonstrates that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based
upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some
sort of economic endeavor.").
113. Id. at 613.
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activity is economic in nature." 114
Accordingly, one important question for the future of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence is what kinds of private activity the Court will treat as economic.
The dissent in Solid Waste Agency argued, for example, that the objective of the
Migratory Bird Rule was to regulate "the discharge of fill material into the
Nation's waters" and that such activity was plainly "undertaken for economic
reasons." 115 However, the majority was skeptical because the federal government had not previously defended the Rule on this rationale. 116 That a law
regulates commercial activity does not mean that the relevant activity for
aggregation purposes is economic, for what seems to matter primarily to the
Court for purposes of demarcating the scope of congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause is the law's objective, rather than the means by which this
objective is achieved. In Solid Waste Agency and Morrison, the Court seems to
suggest that what matters for purposes of aggregation in Commerce Clause
cases is whether the basic purpose of the law is economic, not whether some
economic activity is the means to achieve a noneconomic objective, such as
clean water or air. 117 If the Court means to focus on the former inquiry, the
obvious question is: How much difficulty does this understanding of the Commerce Clause pose for the modem administrative state?
The answer is: not much. First, aggregation is a relevant consideration under
Lopez's third prong where the Court considers whether an activity bears a
substantial relationship to interstate commerce. It is entirely conceivable that the
Court would accept that regulation of the nation's water and air is permissible
under the Commerce Clause because air and water are channels of interstate
commerce that the federal government is trying to preserve. Moreover, Lopez
accepts regulation of instrumentalities of interstate commerce as valid congressional exercises of Commerce Clause power. 118 It is possible to stretch the
analysis further to characterize both air and water as essential commodities for
human existence and to argue that their protection makes a national economy
possible. Without these commodities, we ultimately cease to exist as economic
(or any other kind of live) actors. The latter construction admittedly seems
strained, especially given the Court's apparent disdain in Solid Waste Agency for
the government's post hoc justification of the Migratory Bird Rule in economic
terms! 19
Second, the economic-noneconomic distinction may be more prospective
than retroactive. In other words, the Court may be reluctant to use this distinc-

114. ld.
115. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 194 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
116. !d. at 173.
117. Cf id. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12.
118. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
119. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173.
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tion to reopen debate about the legitimacy of long-standing laws. 120 One
possibility is that through this distinction the Court may be giving lower courts
and Congress the means to justify pre-existing laws that would otherwise have
difficulty fitting within the Lopez framework and be prepared to defer to
congressional and other judicial efforts to use these means to effectuate that
purpose. This is one-albeit quite generous-way to construe the significance
of the Court's refusal to grant certiorari in a case involving a question about the
constitutionality of federal regulation of the small red wolf population via the
Endangered Species Act. 121
Third, another category of permissible legislation may be conceivable under
the Lopez framework, though it has to date been neglected. While environmental and particularly wetlands regulations arguably do not fit easily within the
Lopez framework because they do not purport to have an economic purpose,
they conceivably have a comprehensive objective. In the next section, I consider
whether comprehensiveness is a relevant factor for determining the constitutionality of Commerce Clause enactments.
3. Comprehensive vs. Noncomprehensive Regulatory Schemes
In an interesting Essay, Professor Adrian Vermeule suggests that the Supreme
Court in Lopez and Morrison failed to take into account that Commerce Clause
review will promote not the intended effect of decentralization, but rather more
comprehensive regulation. 122 Professor Vermeule notes that this prospect is
evident in Hodel v. Indiana, 123 "which stated that challenged provisions not
valid in themselves will be upheld if they are an 'integral part of [a] regulatory
program' that is valid when taken as a whole." 124 Moreover, Professor Vermeule
directs attention to language in Lopez already taken seriously by lower courts, in
which the Court finds that the act struck down in the case:
"[l]s not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained in our cases upholding regulations

120. This position depends on the lower courts not only upholding federal laws but also expanding
on the rationales for upholding them, thereby making it easier for the Court to avoid questions of
constitutional law arising from the laws being struck down.
121. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding application of the Endangered
Species Act by a divided panel), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). In Solid Waste Agency, Justice
Stevens cited approvingly to Gibbs as an analogous circumstance to demonstrate the "causal connection
between the filling of wetlands and the decline of commercial activities." Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S.
at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("'The relationship between red wolves takings and interstate commerce
is quite direct-with no red wolves, there will be no red wolf tourism."' (quoting Gibbs, 214 F.3d at
492)).
122. See Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VrLL. L. REv.
1325 (2000).
123. 452 u.s. 314 (1981).
124. Verrneule, supra note 122, at 1331 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 329 n.l7 (1981)).
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of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction,
which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce." 125

For a recent example of this reasoning, look no further than the dissent in
Solid Waste Agency. At one point, Justice Stevens defends the Migratory Bird
Rule by referring no less than six times in a single paragraph to the Clean Water
Act (CWA) as a comprehensive regulatory scheme of which the Rule was an
integral part. 126 Justice Stevens drives this point home two pages later: "By
1972, Congress' Commerce Clause power over 'navigation' had long since been
established .... The activities regulated by the CWA have nothing to do with
Congress' 'commerce power over navigation.' Indeed, the goals of the 1972
statute have nothing to with navigation at all." 127 He explains further in the next
paragraph:
[T]he interests served by the statute embrace the protection of "significant
natural biological functions, including food chain production, general habitat,
and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites" ... For wetlands and "isolated" inland lakes, that interest is equally powerful, regardless of the proximity of the swamp or the water to a navigable stream. Nothing in the text, the
stated purposes, or the legislative history of the CWA supports the conclusion
that in 1972 Congress contemplated-much less commanded-the odd jurisdictional line that the Court has drawn today. 128

In short, the Corps's jurisdiction is no longer limited by the term "navigation,"
but rather extends to "waters over which federal authority may properly be
asserted." 129
The major problem in the dissent's argument is readily apparent. The Clean
Water Act plainly limits the Corps's jurisdiction to "navigable waters," however
one construes these explicit terms. As long as these terms are in the statute, it is

125. /d. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). Two lower court opinions figure
prominently in Vermeule's analysis: Gibbs and United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997).
126. In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted:
The Act ... was universally described by its supporters as the first truly comprehensive
federal water pollution legislation. The "major purpose" of the CWA was "to establish a
comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of water pollution." ... And "[n]o
Congressman's remarks on the legislation were complete without reference to [its] 'comprehensive' nature." ... A House sponsor described the bill as "the most comprehensive and farreaching water pollution bill we have ever drafted," ... and Senator Randolph, Chairman of
the Committee on Public Works, stated: "It is perhaps the most comprehensive legislation that
the Congress of the United States has ever developed in this particular field of the environment." ... This Court was therefore undoubtedly correct when it described the 1972 amendments as establishing "a comprehensive program for controlling and abating water pollution."
Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
127. Id. at 181 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
128. /d. at 182 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
129. /d. (citation omitted).
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hard to deny their plain meaning. Perhaps even more devastating for Professor
Vermeule's provocative point is that the dissent's argument regarding comprehensiveness seems to have had no apparent impact on-or recognition in-the
majority's analysis.
Moreover, it is hard to read Lopez as creating an exception for comprehensive
regulatory measures. For one thing, Lopez does not explicitly refer to comprehensiveness as a category of permissible regulation. Moreover, the Court's statement in Lopez to which Professor Vermeule alludes is likely predicated on the
assumption that the regulatory scheme has an economic objective or that the
private economic activity it seeks to regulate is central to the objective of the
regulatory scheme. Morrison and Solid Waste Agency accept the economic
character of an act as a prerequisite for its serving as a subject of Commerce
Clause regulation. 130 Hence, a comprehensive scheme will probably not pass
constitutional muster simply because it is comprehensive. It will pass muster
only if it falls within one of the three formal categories recognized in Lopez. An
essential element appears to be that either a statute's objective must be economic or the activity at which it is directed must be economic. This conclusion
brings us back not just to one new formalism in the Court's doctrine-the
economic-noneconomic distinction-but also to the inquiry into just how much
this distinction requires dismantling environmental regulation.
III.

THE NONREVOLUTIONARY RESPONSES TO SOLID WASTE AGENCY

In this final Part, I examine the significance of recent nonjudicial developments relating to the protection of the environment, including responses to the
Court's overturning the Migratory Bird Rule. As I will argue, I do not view
these as signaling any significant alteration in federal environmental policy.
To put these responses in perspective, one must first consider the implications
of at least three signs of revolutionary posturing on the part of the Bush
Administration. The first and most significant of these are the tax cuts passed by
Congress in early 2001 131 and those proposed by the President in the aftermath
of the terrorist attacks against the United States. 132 By removing over $1.3
trillion from potential federal expenditures over the next decade, the Bush
Administration has guaranteed less money for a wide variety of federal programs and initiatives, though at this stage we can only speculate as to which
130. See discussion supra section ll.o.2.
131. See David Rosenbaum, Congress Agrees on Final Details for Tax-Cut Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
200 I, at A I. One problem that is already apparent with the tax cut is the possibility of subsequent
adjustments in its size as Congress nears the outer boundary of the implementation period. Of course,
this situation became further complicated by a national recession and the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks against the United States.
132. See Congress Leaves Without Stimulus, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 2001, at A2 (reporting
that "[t]his year's economic stimulus bill officially died when Senate Republicans tried yesterday to
bring up a bill that President Bush backed to cut taxes and expand benefits for the unemployed ....
Majority Leader Tom Daschle, used his power to block a vote, saying the bill contained too many tax
cuts for business and the wealthy and not enough aid for the unemployed.").
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specific federal programs and initiatives will be weakened or eliminated as a
result.
Second, no sooner had President Bush taken office than he executed three
major shifts in environmental policy from the prior administration: (1) his order
on Inauguration Day delaying for sixty days the implementation of all regulations adopted by the Clinton Administration in its waning days (including,
among other things, regulations to protect the environment); 133 (2) his authorization of the United States to pull out of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; 134 and (3) his
decision to withdraw pending rules on the acceptable levels of arsenic in
drinking water. 135 Together, these decisions raised the specter of the new Bush
Administration as the antithesis of the Clinton Administration in the field of
environmental regulation.
Third, President Bush seemed to remove further doubt about the possible
revolutionary direction of his Administration on environmental matters when he
clearly evidenced his intent to nominate to various environmental posts individuals who not only have come from the industries that they will be charged with
overseeing, but who also have been outspoken advocates for expanded legal
protections of property rights. 136 If confirmed, these individuals will join others
in the administration, including Vice President Cheney, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Interior Secretary Norton, all of whom, prior to joining the Administration, expressed similar hopes for shrinking federal interference with local land
use that might in some ways threaten the environment. 137
The implications of these three developments are potentially misleading, for
there are even stronger indications of the absence of a revolution in environmental policy. Perhaps most importantly, the current administration has upheld
numerous initiatives and rules adopted in the closing days of the Clinton
Administration to protect the environment, including, among others, rules con-

133. Regulatory Review Plan, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,702 (Jan. 24, 2001).
134. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. See President's Letter to Senators Helms, Craig, Roberts, and Hagel, 37 Pub.
Papers 431, 431-61 (Mar. 13, 2001) (discussing the Kyoto Protocol and the Bush Administration's
intention not to implement the treaty's provisions).
135. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 16,134 (Mar. 23, 2001)
(delaying the effective date of the Clinton Administration arsenic rules); National Primary Drinking
Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,580 (Apr. 23, 2001) (announcing the intention of the Bush
Administration EPA to propose revised regulations on arsenic levels in drinking water).
136. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush Is Choosing Industry Insiders to Fill Several Environmental Positions, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2001, atAIO.
137. See, e.g., Dick Cheney's Political Resume, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2000, at A22 (describing Dick
Cheney's conservative record and its possible effect on 2000 election); Douglas Jehl, The 43rd
President; Interior Choice Sends Signal on Land Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2000, at AI (noting the
selection of Gale Norton as indicative of President Bush's views on Alaskan drilling); Deirdre
Shesgreen, Senators Say Ads Won't Alter Stand on Road Rules, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Apr. 28, 1999,
at A 11 (discussing John Ashcroft's environmental record as a Senator).
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ceming lead; 138 the recognition by executive order of eighteen national monuments designated by President Clinton under the Antiquities Act; 139 a ban on
snowmobiles in two national parks in Wyorning; 140 the pending regulation to
put almost sixty million acres of public forest off-limits to road building; 141 and
a ruling that requires developers to obtain permits under the Clean Water Act
before carrying out certain earth-moving activities that harm protected wetlands. 142 Of particular interest for our purposes is the fate of the executive order

138. Lead and Lead Compounds, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,500 (Jan. 17, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
372); see also Julie Mason, Bush Keeps Tough Plan to Cut Lead, HousTON CHRON., Apr. 18, 2001, at
AI.
139. See Dana Milbank & Eric Pianin, Bush to Counter Environmental Criticism; Outrage over
Regulatory Changes Pushes Administration to Tout Green Policies, WASH. PosT, Mar. 31, 2001, at A6.
While Interior Secretary Norton requested that state and local governments indicate their desired
"boundary adjustments" to allow commercial activity in some of the areas designated as national
monuments. See Watching Mr. Bush on Earth Day, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 2001, at A24 (quoting Interior
Secretary Norton). However, the Director of the White House's Domestic Policy Council emphasized
the administration's intention to "keep these monuments in place." Milbank & Pianin, supra, at A6.
140. Changes to Proposed Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,260 (Jan 22, 2001); see also Eric Pianin, Bush Backs
Ban on Snowmobiles in 2 llfyoming Parks, WASH. PosT, Apr. 24,2001, at A3.
141. See Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed Reg. 3,244 (Jan. 12, 2001). The Clinton Administration's so-called "Roadless Forest Rule" has posed several difficulties for President Bush. After an initial
order requiring a review of this and other last-minute measures adopted by the Clinton Administration,
President Bush put a sixty-day hold on the implementation of the rule to consider whether to uphold the
regulation in question. Roadless Area Conservation: Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,899 (Feb.
5, 2001). The Bush Administration's review of this rule was further complicated by a lawsuit brought
by a major timber company and the State of Idaho to secure an injunction against its implementation.
Subsequently, the district judge in the case nullified President Bush's May 12, 2001 order to allow the
rule to be implemented and issued a preliminary injunction. See Katherine Pfleger, Judge Axes Forest
Road-Building Ban, CHI. TRIB., May 11, 2001, at Al4. More recently, the Bush Administration failed to
take further action to impede or delay issuance of the preliminary injunction. See Feds Won't Fight
Ruling Against Forest-Road Ban, SEAITLE TIMES, July 11, 2001, at B3. The notice and comment has
also attracted other expressions of significant opposition to further delay in implementing the rule. See
Mike Ferullo, Scientists Urge Bush to Move Forward on Clinton-Era Ban on Forest Roads, DAILY
ENv'T REPORT (BNA), 174 DEN A-2 (2001), Sept. 10, 2001. The case is now on appeal to the Ninth
Circuit. See Pane/Is Asked to OK Roadless Rule, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at B4.
142. See Douglas Jehl, E.P.A. Supports Protections Clinton Issued for Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2001, at AI. A challenge to the rule is pending. See id. There are many other Clinton Administration
initiatives and rules ultimately adopted or ratified by President Bush, including: a rule mandating a
massive reduction in the level of sulfur in diesel fuel, Control of Air Pollution from New Motor
Vehicles, 66 Fed. Reg. 5,002 (Jan. 18, 2001); a rule amending the rules on construction on wetlands that
result in the discharge of dredged materials, Further Revisions to the Clean Water Act Definition of
"Discharge of Dredge Material," 66 Fed. Reg. 4,550 (Jan. 17, 2001); the implementation of a rule
seeking to reduce haze in national parks and proposing, inter alia, new guidance on controlling
pollution from power plants, Proposed Guidelines for Best Available Retrofit Technology Determinations Under the Regional Haze Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,108 (July 20, 2001); an agreement to
implement all Clinton-era rules not subject to pending litigation governing the exposure of miners to
diesel fumes, Diesel Particulate Matter Exposure of Underground Metal and Nonmetal Miners, 66 Fed.
Reg. 35,518 (July 5, 2001); and the decision to publish unchanged a rule dealing with the reduction of
hazardous waste air pollution emission from iron and steel plants, National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants: Integrated Iron and Steel Manufacturing, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,836 (July 13,
2001). In addition, the Bush Administration has expressed its willingness (l) to publish unchanged a
rule proposed by the prior administration regarding bioengineered crops, Premarket Notice Concerning
Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,706 (Jan. 18, 2001), see Karen L. Werner, EPA Plant Incorpo-
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issued by President Clinton in response to Solid Waste Agency requiring federal
agencies to consider the impact of their activities on migratory birds. 143 The
order directed federal agencies to develop within two years a memorandum of
understanding with the Fish and Wildlife Service if their actions might have a
"measurable negative effect on migratory bird populations." 144 To date, President Bush has done nothing to alter, much less indicate an intention to rescind,
this order. 145
Moreover, another important force in constitutional law is stare decisis.
Though not often recognized, there are at least two significant kinds of stare
decisis for constitutional law purposes. One kind has to do with the Supreme
Court's decisionmaking. In this realm, it is telling that in only one of the cases
in which the Court has struck down a federal law in the past six years did the
Court overturn a Commerce Clause precedent. 146

rated Protectant Rules Expected to Exempt DNA from Tolerances, DAILY ENv'T REPORT (BNA), 135
DEN A-4 (2001), July 16, 2001; and (2) to facilitate a cleanup effort begun under President Clinton to
repair damage done by General Electric's dumping of PCBs into the Hudson River, see Mrs. Whitman
Stays the Course, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, at A20. Last but not least, after various delays, the Bush
Administration eventually agreed to the standards initially adopted by the Clinton Administration to
govern acceptable levels of arsenic in drinking water. See Edward Walsh, Arsenic Drinking Water
Standard Issued; After Seven-Month Scientific Review, EPA Backs Clinton-Established Levels, WASH.
PosT, Nov. I, 2001, atA31.
143. Responsibilities of Federal Agencies to Protect Migratory Birds, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,853 (Jan. 17,
2001).
144. /d. In addition, the Corps has developed a new definition of "wetlands" in response to the Solid
Waste Agency decision. At a meeting on March I, 200 I, the Corps changed its working definition of
wetlands for purposes of Clean Water Act jurisdiction. Interestingly, the new definition confirms
Professor Vermeule's theory about the possibility of Commerce Clause doctrine producing perverse
effects, for the new definition reflects the Corps's effort to adopt a broader or more comprehensive
jurisdiction rather than a narrower one in response to the Court's decision. This final impact of the
Corps's action is called into question, however, by the continued activity post-Solid Waste Agency in
defining federal jurisdiction by the federal courts. See, e.g., Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d
265 (5th Cir. 2001) (refusing to extend federal statutory protection of navigable waters to groundwater
in absence of statutory language or evidence of congressional intent); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent
Irrigation Dist., 243 F. 3d 526 (9th Cir. 200 I) (extending federal statutory protection to artificially
constructed canals as waters of the United States).
145. Opening the Arctic reserves to oil exploration poses the possibility of significant harm to the
migratory birds that use the reserves as habitat. Indeed, this possible harm was just one of the reasons
leading to the Senate's refusal to endorse the plan. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/2?dl07;
SP03132 (reporting Senate's rejection of amendment that contained the plan on April 18, 2002). At this
time, it is unclear how much of the reserves will be opened to exploration and how much of the
exploration itself will pose a risk to migratory birds.
146. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (overturning Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I (1989), and holding, for the first time, that Congress has no authority to
override Eleventh Amendment immunity as part of an otherwise valid exercise of an Article I power,
including the power to regulate interstate commerce). I hasten to add that the Court has overturned at
least two precedents on the scope of congressional authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 235 ( 1995) (overturning Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)).
Moreover, I expect it will be just a matter of time before the Court overrules Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which overruled National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). A series of Commerce Clause decisions, including New York v. United
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A second significant realm of stare decisis is political. In this realm, one
should recall that the twin monuments of modem environmental law-the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts-do not owe their origins, strictly speaking, to
the Democratic Party; they are Republican legacies, dating back to none other
than Republican President Richard M. Nixon. 147 I do not doubt that there are
powerful forces in the Republican party seeking to dismantle these legacies, but
I seriously doubt that this Republican President and this Republican House
possess the resolve and political support to proceed with, and be held accountable for, their dismantlement.
In addition, the shift in control of the Senate back to the Democrats in May
2001, resulting from Senator James Jeffords's decision to leave the Republican
party to become an Independent and vote with the Democrats in organizing the
Senate leadership, 148 will hinder retrenchment of environmental and constitutional law in both expected and unexpected ways. 149 This shift will almost
certainly ensure that Congress will not approve any significant legislative
curtailment of current environmental laws. The Democratically led Senate is
highly unlikely to approve any legislation that would weaken federal environmental policies.
Nor do I imagine that Congress, as it is presently constituted, will expand
environmental laws. The Democrats' majority is razor-thin in the Senate; the
party is not ideologically unified; and even if the Democrats were able to get
ambitious environmental legislation passed in the Senate, they seem unlikely to
get a favorable reception in the more conservative House.
These prospects leave a fairly clear playing field for President Bush. He will
be relatively free to bypass Congress through issuing executive orders to effect
or promote his preferred environmental policies, whatever they may be. Once
he issues an order, the prospect of reversal is almost nil. Even if majorities
could be mustered in both chambers to fashion legislation to overturn his orders,
President Bush may veto the legislation, and Congress's ability to override the
veto, given the composition of both chambers, is quite remote. Thus, President
Bush seems to have a significant advantage in shifting environmental enforcement in directions that he prefers. Ironically, such shifts are not likely to evince
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), have whittled away the ruling in Garcia. It is hard to say whether the
overruling of Garcia will be a seismic event in constitutional law, in part because the line of decisions
of which it is a part has been unstable for decades.
147. See generally ENVTL. POLICY D1v., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN
AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970 (1974); ENVTL. POLICY DIV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 (1973).
148. See Katharine Q. Seeyle & Adam Clymer, Balance of Power: The Power Shift; Senate
Republicans Step Out and Democrats Jump In, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,2001, at AI.
149. Indeed, no sooner had the news of the shift been made public than the media declared
effectively dead President Bush and Vice President Cheney's intention to open some of the Arctic
Wildlife Refuge for oil exploration. See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Daschle Quick to Explain What New
Senate Math May Mean for the Bush Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2001, at A9; Robert Schlesinger, A
Shift in Power Energy Legislation; Move Gives Democrats More Muscle on Environment, BosTON
GLOBE, May 25, 2001, at A25.
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a revolution, but rather just the opposite. With every effort he takes as President
to consolidate executive power, he merely reinforces the growth of the executive branch and particularly executive power that is a legacy of the New
Deal. I5° Moreover, I would expect this shift to put even more pressure on
President Bush's appointees to environmental and other sensitive posts to make
reassuring pledges of their intentions to enforce fully and fairly all federal laws
for whose enforcement they will be responsible-and not just the laws with
which they previously expressed agreement.I 5 I
If we take these appointees at their word (and why shouldn't we?), they
intend no revolution in environmental law. Even more important are the words
of the President. Thus far, Bush is a President who has made recourse to the
bully pulpit on only a few select issues: his announcements of nominations, his
tax cut, his support for faith-based charities, his energy policy, and, most
importantly, the war against terrorism. In none of his public rhetoric on these or
any other issues has he hinted at, much less called for, as revolution. He has
assiduously avoided grounding any public policy in an underlying ideology,
except perhaps for his references to the now well-worn but amorphous concept
of compassionate conservatism. Even in the aftermath of Senator Jeffords's
defection, the President did not defend any ideology, but rather spoke simply of
getting "results" for the American people. I5 2 Without national leaders across all
three branches advocating or supporting revolution, there can be no revolution,
and at present, there are no such leaders.

150. I am inclined to view the consolidation of presidential authority to combat terrorism over the
past few months-by virtue of unilateral orders authorizing military tribunals for noncitizens accused
of terrorism and the provisions of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
and the proposed Department of Homeland Security under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R.
5005, l07th Cong. (2002)-as reinforcing the broad authority already exercised by President Bush in
the environmental realm. To be sure, the former authority relates to national security, which traditionally has been viewed as distinct from domestic policymaking. That the war on terrorism is being fought
not just abroad, but also domestically, has placed the President in the special position of employing his
broadened national security authority at home and even more than perhaps is usual, at the expense of
Congress. See, e.g., R.W. Apple, Jr., Big Government Is Back in Style, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,2001, at B2;
Edwin Chen, Bush Refuses to Turn Over Justice Records to Congress, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2001, at AI;
Dana Milbank, In War, It's Power to the President, WASH. PosT, Nov. 20, 2001, at AI. One possible
consequence is an increasing receptivity to executive acquisition or consolidation of administrative
authority. Thus, George W. Bush, who campaigned for smaller government, has ironically taken the
lead in consolidating domestic authority over a wide range of areas, including but not limited to,
homeland security. Such consolidation is only likely to accelerate with division or indecision in
Congress. See Ryan Lizza, Power House, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 24, 2001, at 10; see also Stephen Breyer,
Our Democratic Constitution (Oct. 22, 2001) (James Madison Lecture delivered at the New York
University Law School) (suggesting, among other things, that "trust in government has shown a
remarkable rebound in response to last month's terrible tragedy"), available at www.supremecourtus.gov/
·
publicinfo/speeches/sp_I0-22-0l.html.
151. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointments Process, 50
DuKE L.J. 1687 (2001) (discussing, inter alia, the relationship between such reassuring rhetoric and
smooth confirmation).
152. Frank Bruni & David E. Sanger, Bush Defends His Stance Despite Stinging Defection, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25,2001, atA20.
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Another critical development has to do with state responses to Solid Waste
Agency. Interestingly, several states responded quickly to the decision by either
enacting or recommending the enactment of laws to fill the void left as a result
of the Court's decision. These states include California, Connecticut, Illinois,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 153 Of
course, this reaction is a clear illustration of environmental federalism in
action. 154 However, it should not be taken as a sign of the restoration of a
Constitution-in-exile. References to such a constitution presuppose a state of
affairs, presumably one in which there was widespread support for property
rights and general hostility to progressive regulation of property interests. As
such, the Constitution-in-exile bears no real resemblance to the actual state of
the law prior to 1937. Even during the so-called Lochner era, states did not
enact progressive regulations of the environment, though the doctrine in existence at the time would have been supportive of such enactments. 155 Thus, we
are left to wonder precisely what a revolution aimed at restoring some long lost
ideal would truly be aimed at recapturing. The problem is that there is nothing
to recapture. There is no Constitution-in-exile, for there never was prior to
1937 a single, dominating conception of the Constitution. A revolution purportedly aimed at restoring such a constitution would be directed at nothing. As a
character in Robert Penn Warren's All the King's Men eloquently declares,
"[Y]ou cannot lose what you have never had." 156
Last, but far from least, the dynamic of our constitutional universe has
changed after September 11, 2001. The war on terrorism has already pushed
many items, particularly those likely to divide the political parties intensely, off
the national agenda at least for the foreseeable future. This dynamic has left

153. See Assemb. B. 949, 2001-2002 Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001); H.B. 5949, 2001 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2001); H.B. 3060, 2001-02 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2001); H.R. 200,
2001-02 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2001); H.B. 1344, 2001 Gen Assemb., Sess. 2001 (N.C. 2001);
Exec. Order 8, !24th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001); S.B. 172, 7lst Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2001); S.B. 223, Gen. Assemb., I 14th Sess. (S.C. 2001); H.B. 2292, Gen. Assemb., 2001 Sess. (Va.
2001); Assemb. B. 215, 2001-01 Leg., 95th Legis. Sess. (Wis. 2001); S.B. lA, 2001-02 Leg., Spec.
Sess. (Wis. 2001).
154. Depending on the issue, states sometimes respond to limitations, failures, and gaps in federal
enforcement by calling for more federal involvement rather than develop solutions of their own. See,
e.g., James Sterngold, State Officials Ask Bush to Act on Global Wanning, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at
Al2.
155. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, 201 (1991) ("Both
[Professor] Cooley and the Supreme Court read into substantive due process doctrine a theory of
externalities much like Pigou's. The Court approved regulatory legislation if it was convinced that
market exchanges produced negative externalities for which the bargaining parties would not account."); Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Fonnative Era, 79 B.U. L. REv. I, 19 (1999)
("Against this background, all firms were subject to two forms of regulation, regardless [of] whether
they received any special aid from the state. First, like anyone else's liberty, the liberty of firms was
circumscribed by the duty not to interfere with someone else's rights, summed up by the ... maxim
... one ought not use one's property to harm another. This duty, in turn, gave rise to the police power,
which authorized the state to prevent such harms.") (citation omitted).
156. ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING's MEN 301 (Bantam Books 1974) (1946).

2002]

ON REVOLUTION AND WETLAND REGULATIONS

2173

many domestic issues to be addressed by the President unilaterally, including
environmental regulation. It also has made national political leaders eager to
pass domestic legislation in which there is significant national interest, as
Congress did with its ambitious legislation mandating educational testing nationally.157 Moreover, the consolidation of executive authority, even over national
security, is likely to further reinforce our existing constitutional order. President
Bush seems bent on limiting his innovations to the national security realm. In
other realms, he seems disposed to preserve the constitutional status quo, as is
already evident in his tracking of his predecessors, from Richard Nixon to Bill
Clinton, in taking the lead on national environmental enforcement and regulation.
CoNCLUSION

The absence of a Constitution-in-exile does not mean that revolution is
implausible. It means that a revolution aimed at restoring such a constitution has
no clear direction. Nevertheless, I suspect, but admittedly without hard evidence, that more than a few community leaders, legal scholars, and several
high-ranking officials in our national government-including the Vice President
if not the President-desire radical change in the realm of environmental law.
You can already see the first steps in this direction: in the concurring opinions of
Justice Clarence Thomas; 158 in the Rehnquist Court's Commerce Clause, Eleventh Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence over the past six
years making it considerably more difficult for the federal government to
regulate state or private activity for the sake of protecting the environment or
civil rights; 159 in the Court's mode of statutory construction designed to curtail
or at least impede the extension of federal authority over isolated wetlandsand perhaps other aspects of the environment/ 60 in the President's massive tax
cut and other further desired tax cuts, which will undoubtedly restrict spending
on environmental initiatives; and in the combative rhetoric of many of President
Bush's judicial, cabinet, agency, and sub-cabinet appointees on behalf of property and state rights and against the ideals of the New Deal and Great Society.l61
Yet, none of these signs point to the initiation of a new constitutional order. It
is relatively apparent that they indicate a concerted effort to define limitations to
the present constitutional order. That they portend any more radical change is
far from clear, for they do not satisfy the requisite conditions for a constitutional

157. See Karen Hosler, Sweeping Education Bill Passes, BALT. SuN, Dec. 19,2001, at 1A.
158. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
159. See Linda Greenhouse, Benchmarks of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at A1; Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Bar Wider U.S. Role Under Clean Water Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10,2001, at A15.
160. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 166-74 (2001).
161. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
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revolution. First, they do not signal, much less constitute, a shift in any of the
basic foundations of the current constitutional order, including but not limited to
the nondelegation doctrine, Chevron deference, and the recognition of the police
power within states and localities and the subjection of federal and state
regulations of economic interests under the Due Process Clause to something
more exacting than the rational basis test. Moreover, recent developments do
not entail revisiting, much less altering, the incorporation doctrine, which has
not been modified for decades. 162 Nor do they entail any direct challenge to the
core tenets of the principal federal enactments designed to protect the environment, including the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Endangered
Species Act, all of which are still fully in force. Even Lopez allows Congress,
under the Commerce Clause, to fashion federal legislation of even the most
localized activity as long as private economic activity is being regulated. When
one views the developments in environmental law in conjunction with other
efforts to fortify, if not broaden, authority to combat terrorism and to improve
education, it is even harder to spot a constitutional revolution in the making. To
the contrary, these developments strongly reinforce the modem administrative
state, which is the New Deal's legacy. A constitutional revolution further
requires significant degrees of consensus and cooperation among national,
political, and judicial officials for an enduring, new constitutional outlook. Such
consensus and cooperation are, at least in my judgment, not yet evident. And it
is of course absurd to suggest the change in constitutional understandings is
enduring without any such shift having yet occurred or even begun.
For those interested in a revolution in constitutional or environmental law,
there is considerable work left to be done, not the least of which is to mobilize
national leaders to give voice to the need and content of a revolution. And for
those who wish to preserve the present constitutional order, all I can suggest is
that you be sure during the next presidential election to read the instructions on
your ballots with great care.

162. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a
Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409 (1990).

